Last month I had the great fortune and pleasure to hear Charlie Munger (Trades, Portfolio) speak at the 2019 Daily Journal (DJCO, Financial) meeting as well as to meet and converse with many Munger groupies from all over the world. Iāve also greatly enjoyed learning from Peter Kaufman, Chad Rowe, Tom Gayner and a few renowned value investors.
This year it seemed like a record number of groupies showed up at the meeting. Munger, as always, answered questions and dispensed wits and wisdom for almost two hours. The groupies were not disappointed (how could we be?).
As always, Munger started the meeting with a brief overview of Daily Journalās business. Then he immediately moved on to an interesting situation ā years ago a big West Coast investment institution asked its supposedly brilliant analysts, who are Harvard and Wharton MBAs, for their single best ideas to create a formula with the collection of the best ideas. The institution thought it would beat the index by a big amount. It sounded plausible. But it failed three times.
Munger posed this simple question: "Why did this plausible idea fail?" And in a typical Munger-esque way, he added:
āIāll bet you thereās hardly one in the audience who knows why that thing failed. Thatās pretty ridiculous demonstration Iām making. How could you not know that? Now that Iām going to leave you that question because I want you perplexed.ā
For those who attended the Daily Journal meeting in the past few years, it shouldnāt be a hard question because Munger already answered it in 2017 ā itās the commitment and consistency bias. Mungerās exact words were:
āWhen you pound out an idea as a good idea, youāre pounding it in. By asking people for their best ideas they were getting the stuff that people had most pounded in, so they believed. They didnāt know why it didnāt āwork because they hadnāt read the psychology books.ā
This year Munger went a step further and made an analogy of the situation:
āOf course what they were looking for is equivalent of the alchemists of centuries ago who wanted to turn lead into gold. They thought you could just buy a lot of lead and waive your magic wand over and it turned into gold. That would be a good way to make money. Of course it didnāt work.ā
The question then becomes, why does Munger think the best ideas of the Harvard and Wharton MBAs are bad? Munger hinted that it might have something to do with the definition of āproperly educated.ā Mungerās definition of ābeing properly educatedā is being right when the professor is wrong, or knowing when the professor is right and when they are wrong. Those brilliant investment analysts who got fancy degrees may not be properly educated.
The lessons Munger wanted us to glean from this example were:
- Some combination of basic morality and sturdy common sense (by which he really meant "uncommon sense") is what you really need to succeed.
- It is very hard to be rational about something very simple.
Munger then went on to explain why Berkshire and Daily Journal have done better than the average ā they tried to do less. The trick of the game is to āhave a few times when you know that something is better than average and to invest only where you have that extra knowledge. So the whole idea of diversification when youāre looking for excellence, is totally ridiculous. It doesnāt work. It gives you an impossible task. What fun is it to do an impossible task over and over again?ā
Later, Munger added, āItās a game of being there all the time and recognizing the rare opportunities when it comes and recognizing that the normal human allotment is to not have very many.ā
This is my sixth year attending the Daily Journal meeting. If I recall correctly, Munger emphasized the importance of āconcentrated investingā in all of them. He also chided the diversification camp each year. Concentrating on your best few ideas sounds so simple and rational. But among all the investors I know, only a handful actually do concentrate on fewer than five ideas. Why is that?
Emulating Munger, Iāll leave that question to you.
After a phenomenal Munger speech, the meeting moved on to the questions-and-answers session. This year more than 50 questions were asked. Among them, five or six questions were specifically related to investing in China. Mungerās message was consistent with what he said in the previous meetings ā what American investors are missing is that there are more opportunities in China than there are in the U.S. The great companies in China are cheaper than they are in the U.S. And the Chinese market is much less efficient. You "gotta fish where the fish are."
Iāve followed Mungerās advice and moved back to China in late 2017. Since then, I have focused on the Chinese market. I can vouch for the accuracy of Mungerās statement. Perhaps in the future Iāll write an article about my experiences investing in Chinese markets.
One groupie asked Munger about the influence that the Stoics had on him and some of his favorite advice from the Stoics. Here is what Munger said:
āI like those old Stoics. And part of the secret of a long life thatās worked as well as mine is not to expect too much of human nature. Itās almost bound to be a lot of defects and problems. And to have you life full of seething resentments and hatred, itās counterproductive. Youāre punishing yourself and not fixing the world. Can you think of anything much more stupid than trying to fix the world in a way that ruins yourself and doesnāt fix the world? Itās pretty stupid. I just donāt do it.ā
Another groupie asked why thereās so little health care in the Berkshire Hathway (BRK.A, Financial)(BRK.B, Financial) portfolio. Munger gave a straightforward answer:
āI think we donāt understand it well enough and we donāt like a lot that we do understand. Those are two pretty good reasons for not investing.ā
One other question I found interesting was about balancing the risk of overdoing a good idea versus the risk of potentially foregoing an opportunity. Munger offered the following advice:
āThe problem that is thoroughly understood is half solved. The minute you point out thereās a bit tension between good ideas yet over done so much theyāre dangerous, and good ideas that still have a lot of runway ahead. Once you have that construct in your head and start classifying opportunities into one category or the other, youāve got the problem half solved. Youāve got to be aware of both potentialities and the tensions.ā
The above are the parts of the meeting that I found most interesting. In the end, I want to thank Mr. Munger again for his generosity in spending time with us and sharing his timeless wisdom and lessons.